Cite this article: Samaha J, Postle BR. 2017 Correlated individual differences suggest a common mechanism underlying metacognition in visual perception and visual short-term memory. Proc. R. Soc. Adaptive behaviour depends on the ability to introspect accurately about one's own performance. Whether this metacognitive ability is supported by the same mechanisms across different tasks is unclear. We investigated the relationship between metacognition of visual perception and metacognition of visual short-term memory (VSTM). Experiments 1 and 2 required subjects to estimate the perceived or remembered orientation of a grating stimulus and rate their confidence. We observed strong positive correlations between individual differences in metacognitive accuracy between the two tasks. This relationship was not accounted for by individual differences in task performance or average confidence, and was present across two different metrics of metacognition and in both experiments. A model-based analysis of data from a third experiment showed that a cross-domain correlation only emerged when both tasks shared the same task-relevant stimulus feature. That is, metacognition for perception and VSTM were correlated when both tasks required orientation judgements, but not when the perceptual task was switched to require contrast judgements. In contrast with previous results comparing perception and long-term memory, which have largely provided evidence for domain-specific metacognitive processes, the current findings suggest that metacognition of visual perception and VSTM is supported by a domaingeneral metacognitive architecture, but only when both domains share the same task-relevant stimulus feature.
Introduction
When humans make decisions, they are capable of estimating the likelihood that their decision was accurate. Intuitively, this metacognitive ability is accurate when an individual's estimate of their decision accuracy (e.g. as expressed by a confidence rating) matches the actual accuracy of their decision [1] . Because decisions can be made on the basis of information from a plethora of sourcesfor example, deciding on the basis of current sensory input versus deciding on the basis of information culled from long-term memory-an outstanding question is whether metacognitive processes are domain-general or domain-specific [2] . A domain-general metacognitive monitoring process would be expected to evaluate the accuracy of decisions made from both perceptual inputs and those based on memory. By contrast, a domain-specific metacognitive system would use independent neural resources or computations to estimate the quality of memory-versus perception-based judgements, for example.
Recent work on this topic has focused on correlating individual differences in metacognition during perception and long-term memory, and has resulted in mixed findings. Several studies have reported non-significant relationships between individual's metacognitive ability in a perceptual task and their metacognitive ability in a long-term memory task [3] [4] [5] , suggesting domain-specific metacognition. However, an experiment using similar tasks did find a reliable & 2017 The Author(s) Published by the Royal Society. All rights reserved.
positive correlation between metacognitive abilities in both domains [6] , and other work has shown correlated metacognitive performance across different perceptual tasks [7] . A number of the above-mentioned studies, however, have also reported that structural and function brain imaging data from distinct regions correlated with metacognitive abilities for the distinct tasks [3, 4, 6] , and a recent experiment showed that patients with anterior prefrontal cortex lesions have a selective deficit in visual perceptual metacognition, but not memory metacognition for a recently studied word list [8] , reinforcing domain-specificity at the neural level.
A lack of cross-task correlation in metacognition may sometimes be difficult to interpret because this could result from procedural differences between tasks not necessarily related to the cognitive construct under investigation (e.g. the use of different stimuli in the perception versus memory task). Furthermore, perception and long-term memory are themselves quite distinct cognitive functions (although they can certainly interact in some situations, e.g. [9] ), and an underexplored question is whether perceptual metacognition relates to metacognition for other cognitive functions more closely related to perception. Across three experiments, we examined whether metacognition in visual judgements is related to metacognition for visual short-term memory (VSTM) judgements using tasks with the same stimuli that differ only in the requirement for memory storage over a short delay (Experiments 1 and 2), or tasks that differ also in the relevant stimulus feature (Experiment 3). Because perception of and VSTM for a given stimulus feature are hypothesized to rely on shared neural representations [10] [11] [12] [13] , we might anticipate that metacognition in these domains is also based on some shared resource, leading to positively correlated individual differences in metacognition across tasks, but only when the task-relevant stimulus feature is shared.
Material and methods (a) Experiments 1 and 2
Because of their similarities, the methods pertaining to Experiments 1 and 2 are described together in this section (figures 1-4), followed by the methods for Experiment 3.
(i) Participants
Forty subjects (20 in Experiment 1: mean age ¼ 21 years, s.d. ¼ 1.67, 10 female, and 20 in Experiment 2: mean age ¼ 20.6 years, s.d. ¼ 2.01, 14 female) from the University of Wisconsin-Madison community participated in these experiments and received monetary compensation. All subjects reported normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and colour vision, and were naive to the hypothesis of the experiment.
(ii) Perceptual task
To probe each individual's perceptual metacognitive abilities, we employed an orientation estimation task with confidence ratings [14] . On each trial, a target grating of threshold contrast embedded in noise (see electronic supplementary material, Methods) was presented centrally for 33 ms with a randomly determined orientation between 18 and 1808, followed shortly (600 ms) by a highly visible probe grating without noise, whose orientation could be rotated via mouse movement. This short interval between the target and probe was necessary to ensure that the probe had no visual masking effect. Subjects were instructed to match the perceived orientation as closely as possible. Subjects pressed the spacebar to input their orientation response and then used number keys 1-4 to provide a confidence rating. Because performance in this task varies continuously (as opposed to a binary correct/ incorrect outcome), we instructed subjects to use the confidence scale to indicate how close they think they came to the true orientation using the scale labels 1 ('complete guess') to 4 ('very close'). These perceptual task parameters were the same for both experiments. See figure 1a for complete trial timings.
(iii) Visual short-term memory task
To probe metacognitive abilities for VSTM, we introduced a delay period between the target and the response probe. In Experiment 1, the delay period was fixed at 7 s, and in Experiment 2 it was randomly sampled from the set: 3.45, 6.30, 9.15 or 12.00 s. The stimuli and all other task events were identical to the perceptual task.
(iv) Procedure
For Experiment 1, perceptual and working memory tasks were performed in separate blocks. Following an initial one-up, threedown staircase (see electronic supplementary material, Methods), stimulus contrast was fixed and each subject completed one block of 120 trials of the perceptual task, followed by three blocks of 60 trials each of the VSTM task, followed by another block of the perceptual task. This resulted in a total of 240 perceptual trials and 180 VSTM trials per subject, completed in a single 1.5 h session. Experiment 2 differed in that perceptual and VSTM trials were intermixed within blocks and randomly determined with equal probability to be either a perceptual trial or one of the four delay periods (between 3.45 and 12 s) of the VSTM task. Intermixing perception and VSTM trials further minimized procedural differences between tasks by eliminating any task-related expecations (because subjects did not know which type of trial would come next) and by removing temporal delays between task performance. Each subject completed 300 trials, seperated into five blocks, resulting in an average (+s.d.) of 55.5 (6.4) perceptual trials and 59 (8.0) trials of each delay period of the VSTM task, after removal of trials based on response times (see below). The total task time was approximately 1.5 h.
(v) Quantifying metacognition
To relate continuously varying task performance (the difference between the subject's response and the true orientation, in degrees) to subjective confidence ratings, we computed rank correlations between absolute error and confidence across trials to capture how well confidence tracks performance. Error should decrease with increasing confidence, so a subject with accurate metacognition would have a stronger negative correlation between confidence and error than a subject with poor metacognition. Although intuitive, this metric is potentially influenced by factors beyond metacognitive accuracy per se, such as task difficulty and biases in confidence scale use (e.g. under-or overconfidence [1] 3 ). To control for these influences when testing the relationship between perceptual and VSTM metacognition, we ran two additional multiple regression models that included covariates for average and task-specific error and confidence (see Statistics). In the case of models with multiple predictors, the relationship between perceptual and memory metacognition was visualized rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org Proc. R. Soc. B 284: 20172035 (figures 2 and 4) using added variable plots (MATLAB function plotAdded.m), which use the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem to partial out the effects of other predictors in the model, revealing the effect of a single predictor while all other predictors are held constant. Predictor R 2 for these models was computed as the sum of squares for the perceptual metacognition predictor divided by the total sum of squares for all other predictors and error.
Additionally, we verified that the results of this analysis were robust to our particular metric of metacognition by repeating all analyses using the non-parametric area under the type 2 receiver operating characteristics curve (A ROC [16] [17] [18] ) as our measure of metacognitive accuracy. This measure is obtained by taking the area under the curve formed by plotting the type 2 false alarm rate by the type 2 hit rate at different type 2 criteria. A type 2 false alarm is an incorrect but high-confidence trial and type 2 hit is a correct and high-confidence trial, and the number of confidence criteria is the number of ratings on the scale minus 1. At values of 0.5, this metric indicates that confidence ratings do not discriminate between correct and incorrect trials, and values of 1 indicate perfect discriminability. A ROC was computed using the method outlined in [16] . Because this metric requires binarizing the data into correct and incorrect responses, we defined thresholds for each subject based on the 75th percentile of their response error distributions such that a trial with error larger than this threshold was considered incorrect. This analytically set performance at 75% for each subject, equating accuracy for this analysis. Using a common threshold of 258 for each subject did not change the statistical significance of any analyses reported with this metric. Prior to any analysis, trials with response times below 200 ms or above the 95th percentile of the distribution of response times across all subjects were excluded. The same trial exclusion procedure was applied to both experiments.
(vi) Statistics
We used linear regression to predict individual differences in VSTM metacognition from variation in perceptual metacognition scores (figures 2 and 4). In a first, 'basic model', we considered only these two variables. Then, to control for individual differences in task performance and confidence ratings, we ran two additional regression models. One included each subject's mean error and mean confidence as covariates (three predictors in total) and the other included task-specific confidence and error as covariates (i.e. mean perceptual error and confidence and mean VSTM error and confidence; five predictors in total). These three models were run for each metric of metacognition (r values and A ROC ; see above) and for both experiments. To test for linear effects of confidence on error (figures 1c and 3d ), we regressed single-trial confidence ratings on absolute error for each subject and task and tested the resulting slopes against zero at the group level using a t-test. To test for performance differences between tasks, we compared median absolute error between the perception and VSTM task with a paired t-test. We additionally tested for a linear effect of delay period duration in Experiment 2 (figure 3b) by fitting slopes to each subject's single-trial absolute error by delay period data and testing these slopes against zero at the group level with a t-test. All tests were two-tailed.
(b) Experiment 3
This experiment was conducted to test whether the correlation between perceptual and VSTM metacognition depended on both tasks sharing the same task-relevant stimulus feature (e.g. orientation). To this end, we compared metacognition in an orientation perception task and a contrast perception task rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org Proc. R. Soc. B 284: 20172035
(figure 5a) to metacognition in an orientation VSTM task. We used two-choice discrimination tasks in Experiment 3 which are amenable to a recently developed Bayesian hierarchical model-based analysis of metacognition that controls for individual differences in task performance and confidence biases while appropriately accounting for variability in individual subject parameter estimates at the group level [19] .
(i) Participants (ii) Contrast perception task
Subjects were instructed to indicate whether the left or right stimulus contained a higher contrast grating (see electronic supplementary material, Methods) using the left and right arrow keys, respectively. Subjects then indicated their confidence using number keys 1-4, where 1 denotes a 'complete guess' and 4 denotes 'very confident'. A target and a standard stimulus were presented simultaneously to the left and right of fixation for 50 ms. The location containing the target was randomly determined on each trial. The standard stimulus was created by averaging a 10% Michelson contrast grating with an 80% contrast noise patch and the contrast of the target grating was adapted for each subject with a staircase procedure (see electronic supplementary material, Methods). Each stimulus also had a randomly and independently determined orientation that was task-irrelevant.
(iii) Orientation perception task
This task required subjects to indicate whether the two gratings had the same or different orientation. Both stimuli appeared simultaneously for 50 ms and then subjects indicated their choice followed by their confidence. On the 'same' trials, both stimuli had an identical orientation, which was randomly determined on each trial (between 18 and 1808), whereas on 'different' trials, one stimulus was offset by 258 clockwise or counterclockwise (randomly determined). Whether a trial was the same or different was randomly determined. Difficulty was controlled by a staircase procedure that adapted the contrast of both stimuli (see electronic supplementary material, Methods).
(iv) Orientation visual short-term memory task
This task also required that subjects indicate whether two gratings were the same or different, but here there was a temporal delay of
(v) Procedure
Each subject completed three blocks of 100 trials for each of the three tasks, resulting in 300 trials per task (with the exception of one subject who only completed 100 trials of the contrast perception task). Blocks of the same task were completed sequentially and task order was randomized. Prior to the start of each new rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org Proc. R. Soc. B 284: 20172035 task, subjects completed 60 trials of an initial one-up, three-down staircase corresponding to that task (see electronic supplementary material, Methods). These 60 trials were not included in any analysis. The staircase was then continuously run throughout each task. The total task time was approximately 1.5 h.
(vi) Model-based analysis of metacognition
We used an estimate of metacognitive efficiency (meta-d 0 /d 0 , or Mratio) that quantifies the extent to which confidence ratings discriminate between correct and incorrect decisions (i.e. type 2 performance), given the underlying difficulty of the discrimination itself (i.e. type 1 performance), thereby optimally controlling for task difficulty and confidence biases [1] . M-ratio is the ratio between the d 0 estimated from the confidence data according to a metacognitively ideal observer and the actual d 0 computed from task performance. Because both metrics are in the same units, M-ratio will approach 1 if all the information used for the type 1 decision was also available to the type 2 decision, indicating optimal metacognition. Values below 1 reflect suboptimal metacognition.
We used a recently introduced hierarchical modelling approach to estimate the cross-task correlation between individual differences in M-ratio, as is implemented in the freely available toolbox HMeta-d [19] for MATLAB. This toolbox is a hierarchical Bayesian extension of Maniscalco & Lau's [15] meta-d 0 model. The advantage of a Bayesian model in this context is that the estimation of group-level parameters of interest (i.e. M-ratio correlation coefficient across tasks) takes into account parameter uncertainty at the single subject level. This means that a subject whose M-ratio is estimated with high uncertainly will contribute less to the group-level parameter estimate than a subject whose M-ratio is estimated more precisely. In typical maximum-likelihood or sum-of-squares fitting [18] , this knowledge of parameter uncertainly is discarded. Simulations suggest this approach produces more accurate parameter recovery and lower false-positive rates than non-Bayesian alternatives [19] . Cross-task M-ratio correlations were estimated using the HMeta-d function fit_meta_d_mcmc_groupCorr.m.
Posterior distributions of parameters were sampled using Markov chain Monte Carlo methods (MCMC) implemented in JAGS (http://mcmc-jags.sourceforge.net). We ran three chains of 20 000 samples each with 5000 burn-in samples. Each subject's log(M-ratio) for each domain are specified as draws from a bivariate Gaussian. We used a weakly informative normal prior on log(M-ratio) which encompasses estimates from 167 previous subjects [19] , and a uniform prior between 21 and 1 for the correlation coefficient. To assess convergence, we ensured that all MCMC chains were well mixed and that the Gelman and Rubins R-hat convergence statistics were between 1 and 1.1. Statistical significance for each correlation was assessed by computing the proportion of MCMC samples that fell below zero, multiplied by 2 (akin to a two-tailed non-parametric frequentist test) and by computing 95% high-density intervals (HDI) on the correlation posterior distributions.
Results (a) Experiment 1
Distributions of response error as a function of confidence are shown in figure 1b. Absolute error significantly decreased with increasing confidence for both the perceptual task (t 19 ¼ 213.48, p , 0.0001) and the VSTM task (t 19 ¼ 214.88, p , 0.0001), indicating that subjects' confidence reasonably reflected their task performance at the group level (figure 1c). Error was also significantly greater in the VSTM task when compared with the perceptual task (t 19 rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org Proc. R. Soc. B 284: 20172035 orientation information when the task required short-term memory maintenance. Confidence ratings were distributed similarly for perception and VSTM tasks (electronic supplementary material, figure S1), and average confidence ratings did not significantly differ between tasks ( p ¼ 0.15). See electronic supplementary material, figure S2 for a breakdown of accuracy and response time by block. Central to our hypothesis, we found a positive relationship across individuals between perceptual metacognition and VSTM metacognition (figure 2). This relationship was observed when using confidence-error correlations as the measure of metacognition (slope ¼ 0. 51 We examined the correlation between all predictor variables in all of our models (table 1) and found that there was collinearity between several (quite expected) covariate predictors (e.g. average confidence predicted average error, perceptual confidence predicted VSTM confidence). Importantly, however, there were no significant correlations between our predictors of interest (both perceptual metacognitive scores, A ROC or r) and any other covariate predictors, indicating that task performance and confidence are unlikely to be driving the cross-task correlation in metacognition. These results indicate that the relationship observed between perceptual and VSTM metacognition was independent of the particular metric used and was not accounted for by correlated individual differences in task performance or average confidence.
(b) Experiment 2
This experiment served to replicate the cross-task correlation observed in Experiment 1 while further minimizing procedural differences between tasks by intermixing perceptual and VSTM trials of differing delays (figure 3a figure S1 ). Importantly, we replicated the positive relationship between perceptual and VSTM metacognition with quantitatively better model fits in a new set of subjects. Using confidence-error correlations (figure 4a), perceptual metacognition robustly predicted VSTM metacognition in the onepredictor basic model (slope ¼ 0.60, t ¼ 5.21 predictor R 2 ¼ 0.60, p , 0.0001), the three-predictor model controlling for average confidence and error (slope ¼ 0.60, t ¼ 4.91, predictor R 2 ¼ 0.59, p ¼ 0.0001) and in the five-predictor model controlling for task-specific confidence and error (slope ¼ 0.59, t ¼ 4.44, predictor R 2 ¼ 0.58, p ¼ 0.0005. All covariate predictors in both control models were non-significant ( p . 0.64). As in Experiment 1, some covariate predictors were significantly correlated (table 1; italicized region), but no covariates were significantly correlated with perceptual metacognition, the predictor of interest. This effect was also observed when using A ROC as the metric of metacognition for the basic model
All covariates in both control models were non-significant ( ps . 0.52).
(c) Experiment 3
Task accuracy (% correct) and metacognitive efficiency (M-ratio) for each task and subject are shown in figure 5b. Accuracy was comparable between the contrast perception task (mean ¼ 78.6%, s.e.m. Figure 5 . Tasks, behaviour and metacognitive correlations from Experiment 3. (a) To compare metacognition across discrimination tasks while varying the task-relevant stimulus feature, subjects performed (i) a contrast perception task, judging which stimulus contained a higher contrast grating, (ii) an orientation perception task, judging whether the two stimuli had the same orientation, and (iii) an orientation VSTM task, judging whether a memorized target grating had the same orientation as a probe grating that appeared 3 s later. (b) Individual subject accuracies ( proportion correct) and estimates of metacognitive efficiency (M-ratio) for each task. Note that because M-ratio for each subject is estimated in the same model, estimates are not fully independent [19] . (c) Posterior distributions of cross-task correlations in metacognitive efficiency. This reveals a strong positive correlation between orientation perception and orientation VSTM metacognition, but not between other tasks. figure S3 ), and was well below the optimal M-ratio of 1 for all tasks (contrast perception: mean M-ratio ¼ 0. , suggesting that a cross-task correlation depends on both tasks sharing the same relevant stimulus feature. We also computed the difference between these correlation distributions and found that the correlation between orientation perception and orientation VSTM memory was significantly larger than the correlation between contrast perception and orientation perception (HDI ¼ (0.07, 1.27), p ¼ 0.027), and trending larger than the correlation between contrast perception and orientation VSTM (HDI ¼ (20.03, 1.24), p ¼ 0.063).
Discussion
Metacognition is an important aspect of decision-making [20, 21] , learning [22] , development [23] and perhaps certain aspects of conscious experience [24, 25] , and can be compromised in psychiatric disorders [26] [27] [28] . It is currently unclear whether an individual with accurate metacognitive abilities in one domain also has accurate metacognition in other domains. In Experiments 1 and 2, we found that individuals with more accurate metacognition in perceptual judgements also showed more accurate metacognition in a VSTM task requiring stimulus maintenance over a brief delay period. A medium to high correlation was present when using two different measures of metacognitive performance, across both experiments, and when controlling for task performance and mean confidence. In Experiment 3, we compared an orientation VSTM task to an orientation perception task and a contrast perception task. We again found a large positive correlation (R 2 ¼ 0.81) between metacognition in the orientation VSTM and orientation perception task, but not between the orientation VSTM and contrast perception task, nor between contrast perception and orientation perception tasks, highlighting the importance of both tasks sharing the same relevant stimulus feature. Importantly, given known biases in VSTM metacognitive judgements [29] , metacognition in Experiment 3 was quantified within a signal detection theory model [15, 19] that controls for confidence biases and task performance. Taken together, these results provide the first evidence in humans for a medium to high positive correlation between an individual's metacognitive abilities in perception and VSTM, when both domains share a common stimulus feature.
The present results contrast with recent experiments examining the relationship between metacognition of visual perception and long-term memory, which have typically observed no correlation [3 -5] (but see [6] ). We reason that, in contrast with long-term memory, VSTM for a given stimulus feature is thought to rely on the same neural representations that support perception of that stimulus feature [10 -13] , and this may underlie the cross-task correlation in metacognitive performance. This explanation follows naturally from 'first-order' models of metacognition according to which confidence and task performance are driven by the same internal representation of stimulus evidence [30 -33] . For example, in signal detection theoretic models, the absolute distance of the decision variable from the decision criterion is a proxy for confidence [34, 35] . Thus, if perception and VSTM were supported by the same internal representation of the stimulus, then the computation of confidence across the two tasks would also be based on the same representations, leading to correlated behaviour. 'Second-order' models of metacognition, by contrast, posit an architecture with a secondary confidence readout process, which may be influenced by additional sources of noise [36] or other signals not directly related to the stimulus, such as action-related states [37, 38] , cortical excitability [39] or arousal [40, 41] . The results of Experiments 1 and 2 are also compatible with second-order models of metacognition, although several possible relationships between first-and second-order processes could explain our findings. Shared first-order (sensory) representations across tasks might be enough to produce a behavioural correlation despite separate secondorder read-out mechanisms. Alternatively, both first-and second-order processes may be shared across tasks, or only the second-order process shared, though this latter possibility is unlikely, given existing neural evidence for shared representations in visual regions across perception and VSTM [13, 42, 43] . The results of Experiment 3, however, provide support for first-order models because they suggest that shared sensory representations underlie the cross-task correlation in metacognition. Because metacognition was not reliably correlated when tasks differed in their relevant stimulus feature, even when both tasks were perceptual, this points towards a first-order model of metacognition. Yet another alternative is that the correlation was dependent on the task structure, for example, because both orientation tasks involved same/different judgements. This account may also explain why a previous report comparing metacognition for contrast and orientation judgements in the context of a visual search paradigm did find correlated individual differences [7] , but recent work comparing a variety of perceptual paradigms with different task structures and stimuli did not find a correlation [44] .
Although the present findings are consistent with some domain-general processing in metacognition for perception and VSTM, correlations at the behavioural level raise further questions about what specific aspects of metacognitive processing are shared. For example, if one's ability to learn stable confidence criteria over time improves metacognitive accuracy [33] , then metacognitive abilities may be high across domains for an individual with superior learning abilities, perhaps related to recent work implicating hippocampal myelination in perceptual metacognition [45] . However, this need not imply that the underlying neural substrate responsible for computing the appropriate levels of confidence is itself domain-general. Similarly, recent work has highlighted specific factors beyond stimulus evidence that modulate confidence, leading to dissociations of confidence and task performance within an individual [46] [47] [48] . For example, spontaneous trial-to-trial fluctuations in oscillatory neural activity in the a-band (8-13 Hz), which is thought to reflect visual cortical excitability [49, 50] , have been shown to bias confidence ratings, but not objective performance in a visual discrimination task [39] . Perhaps a subject who is less susceptible to such influences from sources not directly related to the difficulty of stimulus discrimination would show better metacognition across different domains. Future work examining neural correlates of metacognitive performance across different domains may contribute in a substantive way to this issue. As an example, McCurdy et al. [6] observed a positive correlation between metacognition of perception and recollection memory at the behavioural level, but found distinct (as well as overlapping) neural structures whose grey matter volume related to metacognitive performance in the different tasks. This suggests that only a portion of the processing stages or computations involved in generating confidence need be shared across tasks in order to produce a behavioural correlation. Nevertheless, the experiments reported here provide an important first step for future work by demonstrating a clear correlation between metacognitive behaviour in perception and VSTM.
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